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for the approval and control of closing
attorneys that will reduce the risks that
irresponsible or unqualified attorneys
will misappropriate, misuse, or mis-
handle closing funds. Finally, if the
purchaser insists on retaining his or her
own attorney, regardless of approval by
the insurer, the title-insurance carrier
shall advise the purchaser of the risk of
attorney misappropriation, and indicate
that it is a risk that is or may be covered
by the title-insurance policy.
The court realized that these direc-
tives were new, and that the matters
addressed were complex, controversial,
and relatively unsettled. Therefore, the
court directed the Supreme Court's
Committee on Civil Practice to confer
with experts in the legal profession and
the real estate field, to review and study
the espoused directives and to provide
the court with its recommendations. o-
Joyce E. Raupp
Physician Cannot Deduct
Home Office That Is Not
Principal Place of
Business
In Commissioner v. Soliman, 113
S.Ct. 701 (1993), the United States
Supreme Court held that a self-em-
ployed physician was not entitled to tax
deductions for a home office which did
not qualify as his principal place of
business. The Court, in reversing the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
limited the definition of a principal place
of business to that location where the
physician spent the most time provid-
ing actual medical treatment.
Physician's Use of Home Office
Nader E. Soliman, an anesthesiolo-
gist, spent thirty to thirty-five hours per
week administering anesthesia and post-
operative care in three hospitals. None
of these hospitals provided him with an
office. In addition, he spent two to
three hours per day at home working in
a room used exclusively as an office.
While Soliman did not meet with pa-
tients in this office, he performed a
variety of business tasks there, includ-
ing preparation, billing, professional
phone contacts, and continuing educa-
tion.
In 1983, Soliman claimed federal
income tax deductions for the portion
of his household expenses attributable
to his home office. The Internal Rev-
enue Service Commissioner (Commis-
sioner) disallowed these deductions,
ruling that the home office was not
Soliman's principal place of business
under 26 U.S.C. Section 280A(c)(1)(A).
Soliman petitioned the Tax Court
for review of the Commissioner's deci-
sion. The Tax Court reversed, holding
that Soliman's home office qualified as
his principal place of business. In so
doing, the court abandoned the "focal
point" test which identified the place
where services were performed and in-
come generated as the principal place
of business. The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed, adopting
the Tax Court's test. This test involved
evaluating the home office as the prin-
cipal place of business in terms of its
essential functions to the taxpayer's
business, the amount of time the tax-
payer spent there, and the availability
of other locations for performing the
business office functions.
The Commissioner appealed this
ruling to the United States Supreme
Court. Due to the different interpreta-
tions of the statute among circuits, the
Court granted certiorari in order to
address the issue of whether a home
office qualifies as a taxpayer's princi-
pal place of business under 26 U.S.C.
Section 280A(c)(1)(A).
Principal Place of Business Requires
a Comparative Analysis
The Supreme Court first looked to
the language of the revenue statute.
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code allows a taxpayer to deduct all
ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses. However, Section 280A(c)(1)
qualifies this provision, prohibiting
deductions attributable to the taxpayer's
residence. To deduct expenses attrib-
utable to the business use of the their
homes, taxpayers must qualify for one
of the three exceptions contained in
Section 280A(c)(1). Section
280A(c)(1)(A) allows for a deduction
if the home office qualifies as the
taxpayer's principal place of business.
In examining the statute, the Court noted
that the applicable language does not
refer to the principal office. Instead, it
refers to the principal location, sug-
gesting a comparative analysis of all
the places where business is transacted.
The Court rejected the application
of an objective formula, known as the
focal point test, for deciding whether a
home office is the principal place of
business. The focal point test deter-
mines the principal place of business as
that place where business contacts oc-
cur. Nevertheless, the Court found this
test misleading as it did not consider all
of the relevant facts on a case by case
basis.
The Court recommended two pri-
mary considerations in deciding
whether a taxpayer's home office is his
principal place of business. In making
its decision, the trier of fact must con-
sider the relative importance of the func-
tions performed at each business loca-
tion, as well as the amount of time spent
at each location.
The Court stated that the first con-
sideration requires a comparative analy-
sis of functions performed at each busi-
ness location. The site where goods are
delivered and services rendered is nec-
essary, but not sufficient, in determin-
ing whether the home office is the prin-
cipal place of business. Furthermore, if
the nature of the business requires that
the services be rendered or the goods be
delivered at a facility with unique or
special characteristics, additional
weight is given to the facility as the
principal place of business.
Second, the Court stated that if the
comparative analysis yielded no de-
finitive answer as to the principal place
of business, the factfinder should com-
pare the amount of time spent at the
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home office with the time spent at each
of the other locations where business is
transacted. If the comparative analysis
required by the statute proves inconclu-
sive, the Court cautioned the trier of
fact against finding the home office to
be the principal place of business by
default.
In Soliman's case, the Court main-
tained that the nature of Soliman's an-
esthesiology practice required actual
treatment at hospitals that contained
the special facilities to accommodate
the demands of his practice. The fact
that the functions performed in the home
office were necessary to Soliman's pro-
fessional activities was not controlling.
Further, the Court found that the un-
availability of alternative office space
was not a consideration in determining
whether the home office was the princi-
pal place of business. While acknowl-
edging that Soliman planned and stud-
ied at his home office in advance of
performing treatment, the Court de-
clared the actual treatment in the hospi-
tals was the essence of the professional
service. Therefore, the home office
activities were comparatively less im-
portant to Soliman's anesthesiology
practice than the treatment of his pa-
tients at the hospitals. Moreover, a
comparison between time spent at his
home office (ten to fifteen hours per
week) and time spent at the three hospi-
tals (thirty to thirty-five per week) did
not sustain a finding that Soliman's
home office was his principal place of
business.
In reversing the Fourth Circuit, the
Supreme Court criticized the court for
its failure to perform a comparative
analysis of both the relative importance
of the functions performed and time
spent at each business location. The
Court, in making such an analysis, con-
cluded that Soliman's home office did
not qualify as his principal place of
business. As a result, the Court held
that Soliman's home office deduction
was not allowed under 26 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 280A(c)(1)(A).
Concurrences Question Clarity of
Home Office Deduction Determina-
tion
Justice Blackmun, joining the
Court's opinion, noted that the lan-
guage of the statute, as written, cur-
rently bars a home office deduction for
anything other than the principal place
of business. Blackmun invited Con-
gress to change the statute's language if
it desired a different result.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
Scalia, concurred with the holding.
However, he criticized the Court for
failing to provide a determinative test
for evaluating the principal place of
business. Thomas stated that the two-
part comparative analysis test an-
nounced by the Court complicated rather
than clarified the nature of the principal
place of business. He advocated utiliz-
ing the focal point test which pinpoints
a taxpayer's principal place of business
as that place where goods or services
are rendered.
Dissent Argues That Majority Denied
Taxpayers a Benefit
In his dissent, Justice Stevens criti-
cized the majority's misreading of the
term "principal place of business" con-
tained in Section 280A. Stevens stated
that the Court's reading deviated from
congressional intent and denied ben-
efits to taxpayers. He reasoned that the
principal place of business exception,
by omitting any reference to meeting
with clients, intended to include deduc-
tions for a home office where the tax-
payer would not ordinarily have this
contact. Stevens concluded that when
there is no demonstrated abuse of the
statute, a home office deduction should
be allowed, because it encourages a
self-employed person to make efficient
use of her resources. or
Rosaire M. Hall
Donate Old Computer To
Charity and Get a Tax
Break
By donating your old computer to
charity through the National Cristina
Foundation (NCF) or the East West
Education Development Foundation
(EW), your computer can be put to
good use by non-profit groups both in
the U.S. and abroad. In addition, you
can take an itemized deduction on your
tax return for the fair market value of
your computer.
NCF works with agencies that pro-
vide job training and that support stu-
dents at risk of dropping out of school.
To donate to NCF, call (800) 276-
7846. NCF will take basic information
about the computer and send you a
donor form. Most donors pay for ship-
ping, which is also tax-deductible. But
if you do not want to pay for shopping,
NCF will.
EW assists American agencies and
also supplies technology to groups in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union. To donate to EW, send a de-
scription of your computer to 49 Temple
Place, Boston, Massachusetts, 02111.
EW will try to direct your donation to a
group that you designate.
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